Market Power in Direct Marketing of Fresh Produce: Community Supported Agriculture Farms by Lass, Daniel A. et al.
 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Department of Resource Economics 
Working Paper No. 2005-2 
http://www.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers 
 
 
 
Market Power in Direct Marketing of 
 Fresh Produce: Community Supported 
 Agriculture Farms 
 
Daniel A. Lass1, Nathalie Lavoie2, and T. Robert Fetter3 
 
Abstract: 
 
CSA farms establish a loyal customer base and, potentially, market power. A new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach and survey data from Northeast CSA 
farms are used to determine whether CSA farms have market power and the extent to 
which they exercise their market power. Results suggest CSA farms exert about two 
percent of their potential monopoly power. 
 
Keywords: Community Supported Agriculture; New Empirical Industrial Organization; 
Market Power; Fresh Produce; Organic Agriculture. 
 
JEL Classification: D42, L12, Q13. 
 
________________________ 
1 Daniel A. Lass, Department of Resource Economics 
University of Massachusetts, 211 Stockbridge Hall 
Amherst, MA  01003 
E: dan.lass@resecon.umass.edu  P: 413-545-1501  F: 413-545-5853 
  
2 Nathalie Lavoie, Department of Resource Economics 
University of Massachusetts, 212D Stockbridge Hall 
Amherst, MA  01003 
E: lavoie@resecon.umass.edu  P: 413-545-5713  F: 413-545-5853 
 
3 T. Robert Fetter, Science Applications International Corporation 
405 Urban Street, Suite 400 
Lakewood, CO  80228 
E: fettert@saic.com  P: 303-969-6051  F: 303-969-3305 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Power in Direct Marketing of Fresh Produce: 
Community Supported Agriculture Farms 
 
 
 
 
Daniel A. Lass 
Department of Resource Economics 
University of Massachusetts 
211 Stockbridge Hall 
Amherst, MA 01003 
 
Nathalie Lavoie 
Department of Resource Economics 
University of Massachusetts 
212 Stockbridge Hall 
Amherst, MA 01003 
 
and  
 
T. Robert Fetter  
Environmental Economist 
Science Applications International Corporation 
405 Urban St., Suite 400 
Lakewood, CO 80228 
 
 
January 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research was supported by a grant from Northeast Region Sustainable Agriculture 
Research and Education Program. All comments should be directed to Dr. Daniel Lass, 
211 Stockbridge Hall, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003; or by email: 
dan.lass@resecon.umass.edu.
  
 
Title: Market Power in Direct Marketing of Fresh Produce: Community Supported 
Agriculture Farms  
 
 
Abstract:  CSA farms establish a loyal customer base and, potentially, market power. A 
new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach and survey data from Northeast 
CSA farms are used to determine whether CSA farms have market power and the extent 
to which they exercise their market power. Results suggest CSA farms exert about two 
percent of their potential monopoly power. 
 
 
Key Words: community supported agriculture; new empirical industrial organization; 
market power; fresh produce; organic agriculture. 
 2 
Introduction 
 
With rising land prices, competing land uses, and low prices for agricultural products, 
farm operators must find ways to maintain their economic viability. This is especially 
true in the Northeastern U.S. where input costs are affected by increased land prices, 
higher assessed values, and taxes. Northeast farmers typically face higher prices for 
commercial inputs as well. To improve viability, some farmers focus on product and 
market diversification, reduce chemical input use, introduce new food products, and 
apply innovative marketing techniques. Organic production is attractive due to the 
organic price premium and lower chemical input costs. Moreover, when marketed 
directly to consumers, organic production allows farmers to capture a greater percentage 
of the food dollar. Despite gains from direct marketing, viability of the farm may still be 
a problem for organic farmers. The costs of production may not be covered due to 
fluctuating market prices and higher labor costs. Organic agriculture is perceived to be 
more susceptible to pests due to the inability to intervene by applying synthetic fertilizers, 
insecticides, and herbicides. Perception of this higher degree of risk has led some 
producers to seek a new social and economic basis for agriculture, namely Community 
Supported Agriculture (CSA) (Lamb 1996; Padel and Lampkin 1994). 
CSA is a marketing approach that connects consumers with farmers through 
direct purchase of shares of farm product. Most CSAs provide fresh organically grown 
produce, but there are CSAs that provide shares of fresh herbs, flowers and animal 
products.1 To become a shareholder, consumers agree to purchase a share of the farm’s 
produce prior to the season, usually during the winter or early spring. The farmer then 
produces the crop and provides a weekly bundle of produce to the consumers throughout 
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the growing season, typically from May through October, although some CSA farms 
provide winter shares as well. Having sold shares prior to the season, the farmer can then 
focus on production throughout the growing season. The CSA principle is 
straightforward: by purchasing shares prior to the season, the consumers share the risks of 
farming as well as the rewards (Stern, 1992; Karr, 1993).  
The CSA concept brings together consumers and farmers with similar ideologies. 
CSA shareholders are typically consumers who are interested in where their food comes 
from and how it is produced (Cooley and Lass, 1998). Through CSA, the shareholders 
develop a stronger appreciation for farms and for the linkages between farms and the 
environment (Van En, 1988; Lamb, 1996). The CSA operator has a desire for the farm to 
be self-sufficient, vital, and a healthy part of the community (Karr, 1993). If there is a 
demand for fresh, locally grown, organic food in the community, CSA farmers can 
encourage reliance on locally produced food rather than a dependence upon imported 
produce. One objective of CSA farms is to capture this demand and establish a base of 
shareholders that will return each year, which further reduces their annual marketing 
efforts. 
A loyal customer base and a differentiated product may enable CSA farms to 
exercise, at least to a degree, monopoly power. In this study, we investigate whether and 
to what extent CSA farms exercise market power in their pricing decisions. We estimate 
the degree of market power using a structural econometric model. The finding of market 
power would suggest that CSAs have been successful in improving the profitability of 
family farms, or they at least have that capability.  
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Conceptual Model 
We assume that a typical CSA farm maximizes profit and has the ability to exercise 
monopoly power in selling shares. CSA farms can be considered monopolies because of 
their geographic isolation from other farms (few farms in each region have such an 
operation). Moreover, the nature of their products, i.e., fresh organic vegetables produced 
from a known source, is such that consumer loyalty and “brand” recognition make 
consumers captive to a given farm. In fact, many consumers value the non-market benefit 
of feeling they are supporting local agriculture and sharing the risks and rewards of 
farming in addition to the tangible benefits of fresh produce during the season. Many 
CSA farms enhance the sense of community by hosting additional events for their 
shareholders during the season and by offering reduced-price shares. These reduced-price 
shares may be in exchange for labor, or may be offered to low-income buyers. As such, 
produce purchased at the grocery store is a poor substitute for the produce provided in a 
CSA share.  
Assume that a CSA farm seeks to solve the following maximization problem: 
( )max , ( , , )π = −
q
p q q C qY r E ; 
where p(q,Y), the inverse demand facing the farm, is a function of q, the number of 
shares sold, and Y, a vector of exogenous demand shifting variables. C(r,q,E) is the total 
cost of producing the agricultural goods sold, where r is a vector of input prices and E is 
a vector of exogenous factors that affect farm production. Shares are sold during the 
winter and each share allows a consumer to pick up a quantity of fresh produce each 
week through the summer. Having sold shares prior to planting, the farmer can plan 
production accordingly.  
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We obtain the first-order conditions for the profit maximization problem and 
solve for the share price to determine the supply relation: 
 ( ) ( ), ,λ∂ ∂= − +∂ ∂
p q C q
p q
q q
Y r ,E
; (1) 
where the parameter l is an index of departure from perfect competition and varies 
between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly). Although we assume each farm is in a 
position to exercise monopoly power, we estimate l to examine the extent to which farms 
choose to exercise market power. If the farmer has altruistic feelings towards her 
shareholders, she may seek to forgo some or all of her monopoly rents in the interests of 
her shareholders.  
The value of the market power parameter is obtained by estimating 
simultaneously the supply relationship and the demand equation. There are two methods 
to identify the parameter l. The first method is a production theoretic approach following 
the work of Appelbaum (1982) where the demand equation and supply relation are 
estimated together with factor demand equations. The second method identifies the 
market power parameter through rotation of the demand curve (Bresnahan, 1982; Lau 
1982). Bresnahan (1989), Sexton and Lavoie (2001), and Sheldon and Sperling (2003) 
provide overviews of these two approaches. Applications to agricultural product markets 
are provided by Buschena and Perloff (1991), Love and Murniningtyas (1992), and 
Azzam and Park (1993). According to Sexton and Lavoie (2001), the choice of the 
identification principle depends on the specific application and the types of data 
available. The demand rotation method requires the presence of an exogenous variable 
that interacts with price to determine demand. For example, changing socio-economic 
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characteristics of the market faced by a CSA will cause the demand curve to shift 
allowing identification of both demand and marginal cost parameters (Sheldon and 
Sperling, 2003).  
Assume that the demand equation takes the following linear functional form: 
 . (2) 0 1 2 1* dq p p Y= + + + +3 2α Yα α α ε
Thus, Y1 is the exogenous variable that rotates the demand curve and will allow l to be 
identified. The vector Y2 includes other exogenous variables that affect demand. 
Assume that marginal costs of production for CSA shares also take a linear form: 
 ; (3) 0 1MC q= + + +2 3β r β Eβ β
where r and E represent the input price vector and a vector of other exogenous factors 
that affect CSA share production. Using equations (2) and (3), the supply relationship 
(equation (1)) can be re-written as: 
 , (4) 0 1* sp q q= + + + + +2 3β r β Eλ β β ε
where  
1 2
* qq
Yα α= − + 1 .  
Equations (2) and (4) form a system of equations that can be estimated simultaneously.  
 
Data  
Survey data were obtained by mail from Northeastern CSA farms during 1995, 1996 and 
1997.2 Detailed data were obtained about farm and farmer characteristics, revenue from 
CSA shares, other sources of farm revenue, farm costs, and the CSA share of farm costs. 
There were a total of 82 respondents during the three-year period; some farms 
participated in all three years of the survey.3  Table 1 presents summary characteristics of 
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the CSA farms that responded. These are small farms by conventional measures and all 
were vegetable crop farms. The average amount of cropland was between 18.7 (1997) 
and 23.2 acres (1996). The amount of cropland used for the CSA operation was typically 
about half the total available. CSA farmers are relatively young, on average about 38 
years of age, and educated with the majority having a college degree. Experience, an 
additional measure of human capital, was measured by the total number of years of 
farming experience (all farm experience) and the number of years of experience on their 
current farm. The latter measure is closely correlated with the number of years of 
experience producing organically. These farmers typically had between 11 and 12 years 
of experience farming, with between six and eight of those years on their current farm.  
CSA farmers may make all decisions themselves, or may seek the guidance of a 
“core group.” The core group is a subset of CSA shareholders that meet with the farmer 
to discuss and advise on issues of share content, price, and other CSA organizational 
matters. Core groups may take a passive or advisory role in CSA management by 
meeting with the farmer to discuss shareholder concerns or desires. Or, the core group 
may take a very active role in organization, promotion, and management of the CSA. 
Almost half of the Northeast CSA farms in this sample (48 percent) had a core group. 
The different types of shares offered by the CSA farms that responded are also 
listed in Table 1. The predominant type of share was the full non-working share, i.e., a 
share that typically feeds three to four individuals with no CSA farm work commitment 
required of the shareholder.4 A half share contains about half of the produce of an 
individual share, which typically feeds one or two people. Some farms also offered other 
share types; relatively few “other” shares were sold.  These shares were quite varied in 
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content ranging from senior shares (a share of reduced quantity and price for senior 
citizens) to institutional shares that may serve a large group of people.  
A standard measure of output was determined for all farms by transforming the 
seven types of shares into equivalent numbers of full shares. The number of shares for 
each type of working share sold was weighted by that share price relative to the price of a 
full working share for each farm. Similarly, the numbers of non-working shares were 
weighted by their share prices relative to the price of a full non-working share. These 
weighted shares were then summed to determine the total number of full-share-
equivalents, which is used as a unit of output. Share prices were assumed to reflect 
differences in both quantity of product and the variety of product in shares. On average, 
CSA farms produced a total of 75 full-share-equivalents in 1995 weighing about 374 
pounds.5 In 1996, a total of 77 full-share-equivalents averaging about 330 pounds were 
sold on average. In the final survey year, 1997, 88 full-share-equivalents were sold with 
an average estimated weight of about 324 pounds.  
A summary of CSA farm revenues, costs and net incomes appears in Table 2. 
Revenues were calculated based on sales of CSA shares. Many farms sold produce 
through other outlets such as farmers’ markets. CSA respondents were asked to list 
specific costs associated with farm production and the percent of expenses that should be 
allocated to the CSA operation. In each of the three survey years, average net income was 
positive ranging from $2,724 in 1995 to $8,820 in 1997. On a per-share basis, the CSA 
farms surveyed earned about $36 per share in 1995 and about $95 per share in 1996 and 
1997. The CSA farms in this sample apparently improved their net income position over 
the three years of this study.  
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 Estimation and Results 
Estimation of the demand function required socio-economic characteristics of the markets 
served by each CSA farm. We defined each market as the community in which the CSA 
farm was located. Community characteristics were measured using 1990 U.S. Census 
data for minor civil divisions or MCDs (e.g., townships) where available. If MCD data 
were not available for a specific farm location, Census designated place data were used. 
The data collected included population density, median household income, and 
percentage of high school and college graduates. These community characteristics and 
variables related to the operation of the CSA, which are included in the supply 
relationship equation, are described in more detail in Table A of the appendix. Table B of 
the appendix provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in estimation.  Given 
the cross-sectional nature of these data, we assume a common demand and cost structure 
across markets and farms respectively. Thus, the estimated parameters represent the 
parameters of common demand and cost functions for all CSA farms.  
The model was estimated using pooled time series and cross-sectional data. All 
income, revenue and cost data were deflated to 1995 using the Consumer Price Index; 
tests conducted supported pooling all observations. We tested for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity as well; results of the chi-square test led us to conclude 
heteroskedasticity was not an issue with our model.  The estimation of a structural model 
(demand and supply relationships) allows estimation of the degree to which CSA farms 
exert monopoly power. Identification was obtained by interacting share price and median 
income in the demand equation. Estimation of the demand and supply relationship system 
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was done using a two-step procedure. The demand relationship was estimated and the 
parameters were used to create the variable q* (see equation (4)). This variable and 
quantity (q) were included in the final supply relationship. Both q* and q are endogenous 
and two-stage least squares was used to estimate the final supply relationship.  
Estimates for the structural model, both demand and supply relationships, are 
presented in Table 3. CSA farms do appear to exert market power, albeit very little. The 
estimated market power parameter is 0.02. While the estimated market power parameter 
was statistically different from zero, it suggests CSA farms exert very little market 
power, only about two percent of that of a monopolist.6  
The coefficients of demand-side variables are mostly as expected. Share price has 
the expected negative sign, but does not appear statistically different from zero. However, 
including both share price and the interaction of share price and median income leads to a 
troublesome degree of multicollinearity. The partial effect of price on demand, which 
combines the price effect as well as the interaction, is negative and results in a price 
elasticity of demand of –0.245 when evaluated at the means of quantity, price and 
income. The effect of income on demand was negative, although not statistically different 
from zero. Income may be a proxy for the amount of spare time available. Thus, the 
negative effect of income, an elasticity of –0.22 determined using the partial effect, 
would indicate that has income increases, there is less time to learn to prepare and to 
cook the large of amount of produce in a share, thus reducing the demand for CSA 
shares. The standard errors for income, as well as those for all other estimated 
parameters, did not suffer from multicollinearity as did the estimates for the price and 
price-income interaction variables.  
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The percentage of high-school graduates has a negative and significant effect on 
demand. The coefficient indicates that an increase in the percentage of high school 
graduates by one percent results in a decrease in demand by 2.44 shares. The coefficient 
for the percentage of college graduates is positive, but not statistically significant. While 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem between these variables and median 
income, these two variables may capture some of the income effects on demand. The 
positive coefficient of the percentage of college graduates may represent the effects of 
higher income on demand for that cohort. The estimated effect of a higher percentage of 
residents with a college degree would indicate that having a higher education results in a 
greater demand for CSA shares. More education may be associated with greater 
awareness of nutrition and a preference for organic produce and, thus, a greater demand 
for local fresh organic vegetables. Higher levels of education may also be associated with 
an appreciation for the issues surrounding family farms and the benefits of agriculture to 
the community.   
Population density is statistically significant and positively affects demand for 
CSA shares. Population density indicates greater potential demand for the CSA within 
their market area. Consumers living in more densely populated areas are also likely to 
have a greater demand for CSA shares because they may have less space for a garden and 
may enjoy the access to the farm outdoor space. Having a core group increases the 
demand by about 105 shares, most likely because of stronger interactions between the 
CSA and the community through additional events and services organized by the core 
group. Finally, binary variables were included for two of the three years that CSA data 
were collected (1996 and 1997; 1995 was used as the base year). The estimated effects of 
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the binary variables for 1996 and 1997 are statistically insignificant confirming our 
pooling tests for these three years of data. 
Two estimated coefficients were statistically significant and the signs were as 
expected in the supply relationship. The estimated market power parameter was 
statistically significant and indicates that CSA farmers exerted only about two percent of 
the market power of a monopoly. In previous research, Cooley and Lass found that CSA 
share prices provided important consumer benefits. The CSA ideology is that farmers 
earn a return that covers all costs and provides a living wage. Our results suggest that 
CSA farmers can ensure that they do cover all economic costs of production, include a 
fair wage for the farmer. This result is encouraging when we consider that most farmers 
act as the residual claimant to profits that are typically low or non-existent.   
Core group farms have higher share prices by about $155 per share. We find that 
core group farms are typically larger farms with a more stable shareholder base and 
possibly a waiting list. Core groups are a group of shareholders who are typically 
committed to the CSA ideal and value the farmer’s commitment and services. They may 
be more willing to compensate the farmer for her efforts. The core group helps the farmer 
with organization and promotion of many CSA activities that enhance the CSA. These 
activities may increase demand, but may also imply additional costs. Two variables in the 
model represent the effects of changing size and scale, quantity and CSA cropland 
acreage. The effects of these two variables are a priori unknown. The negative estimated 
effect of CSA quantity (number of shares) suggests that greater output leads to a decrease 
in marginal costs. A change in the scale of the operation, through increased cropland, has 
a positive effect on price. As CSA cropland acreage is increased, ceteris paribus, 
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marginal costs shift upward suggesting decreasing returns to scale for these CSA farms. 
This positive effect makes sense given the importance of the labor input for these organic 
producers.  
The primary farmer’s all-farm experience has a negative impact on the share 
price. Having more farm experience is associated with a lower cost of operation and a 
lower share price. Current farm experience has a positive effect on share price. Current 
farm experience is more closely associated with the farmers experience as an organic 
producer, which may lead to higher marginal costs. Current experience is also more 
closely associated with the farmer’s experience as a CSA farmer, which may also imply 
higher marginal costs. Consistent with expectations, the effect of education, an additional 
human capital measure, is to reduce marginal cost. However, the estimated effect is not 
statistically different from zero.  
  
Summary and Conclusions 
CSA is an alternative form of marketing. Most CSA farms are small vegetable farms that 
provide shareholders fresh organic produce through the growing season. CSAs strive to 
develop a loyal and stable customer base (shareholders) that will reduce (or ideally 
eliminate) the need to market their product each year. CSAs thus try to capture a share of 
the local market for fresh produce and set the price of a share each year. Using pooled 
cross-section time-series data for a sample of Northeast CSA farms, we found that CSA 
farms are able to dictate prices, but they appear to exert a small degree of monopoly 
power in the choice of share prices. CSA farms only exert about two percent of their 
potential monopoly power. While the estimated market power parameter was statistically 
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different from zero, we might question whether the magnitude is economically 
significant. However, exertion of a limited degree of market power exerted increases the 
profitability of family farms. Our results suggest that CSA farmers can command a fair 
price for their product, a price that covers all production costs and a fair wage for the 
farmer. Moreover, CSA farms use sustainable production methods and are committed to 
building a relationship with the community in which they operate. Our results suggest 
that CSA farms have the power to price above marginal costs, but for a variety of 
reasons, they choose to exert very little of that power.  Pricing decisions by CSA farms, 
while dependent upon demand factors, are likely affected by altruistic feelings of the 
farmer towards shareholders.   Thus, our findings suggest that the CSA movement in 
New England improves the profitability of family farms through minimal exercise of 
market power and provides a benefit to the community without government intervention. 
Future research will examine whether those findings hold at the national level. 
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Table 1. Farm Characteristics for the Average CSA Operation in 1995, 1996 and 1997 
 
 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
Number of Farms 23 26 33 
 
Total Cropland (acres) 
CSA Cropland (acres) 
 
22.20  
11.96  
 
23.19 
10.79 
 
  18.72 
    7.59 
Age of Principal Farmer (years) 39.87 38.48 38.41 
Education (proportion of primary farmers with a 
college degree) 0.74 0.85 0.82 
All Farm Experience (years) 11.43 11.04 11.73 
Current-Farm Experience (years) 6.22 7.00 8.24 
Core Group (proportion of CSA farms with a core 
group) 0.48 0.42 0.48 
 CSA Share Prices ($ per share) 
 
Non-working Shares: 
     Full 
     Individual 
     Half 
Working Shares: 
     Full 
     Individual 
     Half 
Other (Senior, Institutional) 
 
 
416.32 
326.00 
243.75 
 
260.67 
    N/A 
135.00 
307.50 
 
 
412.88 
298.29 
247.00 
 
248.89 
205.00 
131.67 
358.33 
 
 
352.98 
270.56 
273.35 
 
246.39 
136.25 
132.50 
266.43 
 
Number of Full Share Equivalents 
 
  75.11 
 
  77.36 
 
  88.07 
 
Pounds of Product per Full Share 
 
374.17 
 
329.85 
 
324.20 
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Table 2.  Costs and Revenue for the CSA Operations. 
 
Average $ - 1995 
 
Average $ - 1996 
 
Average $ - 1997 
 
 
 
per Farm 
 
per Share 
 
per Farm 
 
per Share 
 
per Farm 
 
per Share 
 
Reported Revenue 
Reported Costs 
 
$33,398 
$30,674 
 
$444.77 
$408.50 
 
$35,568 
$28,254 
 
$460.18 
$365.56 
 
$32,182 
$23,362 
 
$349.65 
$253.82 
 
Net Income 
 
$ 2,724 
 
$ 36.27 
 
$ 7,313 
 
$ 94.62 
 
$ 8,820 
 
$ 95.83 
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* Indicates variables that are statistically different from zero at the five percent level of significance. 
Table 3. Estimated parameters of the structural model of Northeast CSA market power.  
Variable Demand (Quantity) Supply Relationship (Price) 
Constant 
 
187.98* 
(2.45) 
332.342* 
(5.17) 
Market Power 
 
-- 
 
0.021* 
(1.96) 
Quantity 
 
-- 
 
-0.667 
(-1.31) 
Price 
 
-0.109 
(-0.66) 
-- 
 
Median Income 
 
-0.001 
(-0.72) 
-- 
 
Price×Median Income 
 
1.72×10-6 
(0.47) 
-- 
 
% High School Grads 
 
-2.444* 
(-2.21) 
-- 
 
% College Grads 
 
0.976 
(0.60) 
-- 
 
Density 
 
0.029* 
(3.61) 
-- 
 
CSA Cropland 
 
-- 
 
2.089 
(1.38) 
Education 
 
-- 
 
-6.273 
(-0.12) 
All Farm Experience 
 
-- 
 
-5.383 
(-1.24) 
Current Farm Experience 
 
-- 
 
6.563 
(1.28) 
Core Group 
 
104.861* 
(5.90) 
155.334* 
(2.62) 
Year 1996 
 
8.420 
(0.42) 
24.146 
(0.47) 
Year 1997 
 
13.830 
(0.72) 
-50.226 
(-0.99) 
R2 
 
0.487 
 
0.260 
 
F 
 
7.59* 
 
2.81* 
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 Appendix 
Table A: Variable descriptions.  
Variable Description 
Quantity 
The total number of shares sold expressed as full shares, also 
called full-share-equivalents. The variable is calculated as a 
weighted average of different share types where the weights are 
the share prices relative to the price of a full non-working share.  
Price The price of a full non-working share ($/share). 
Median Income The median income is the town-level median income from the 1990 U.S. Census (dollars).  
Price×Median Income 
This is an interaction term. The full non-working share price is 
multiplied by the town-level median income. This variable 
allows identification of the market power parameter in the 
structural equation model.  
High School Grads The percentage of the town population with a high school degree as their highest level of education attained. 
College Grads The percentage of the town population with a college degree as their highest level of education attained.  
Density The number of people per square mile.  
CSA Cropland The number of acres of cropland used for the CSA operation. 
Education A binary variable that takes the value of one if the farmer has a college degree and zero otherwise. 
All Farm Experience The number of years of farming experience of the farm operator.  
Current Farm Experience The number of years of experience of the farm operator on the current farm.  
Core Group 
A binary variable that takes the value of one if the CSA has a 
core group. A core group is a subset of the shareholders who 
meet with the farmer to discuss share content, share price, and 
other CSA management/social issues.  
Year 1996 Binary variable: 1 if 1996 data, 0 otherwise. 
Year 1997 Binary variable: 1 if 1997 data, 0 otherwise. 
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 Table B. Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimation.  
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Quantity (number of full-share-equivalents) 81.04 92.02 
Price ($ per full share) 386.72 180.26 
Median Income ($) 33,407.37 12,803.07 
High School Grads (percent) 63.18 10.78 
College Grads (percent) 22.09 9.33 
Density (people per square mile) 980.05 1,223.02 
CSA Cropland (number of acres) 9.83 18.80 
Education (proportion of primary farmers with a college 
degree) 0.80 0.40 
All Farm Experience (years) 11.43 7.27 
Current Farm Experience (years) 7.28 6.04 
Core Group (proportion of CSA farms with a core group) 0.46 0.50 
Year 1996 (proportion of observations from 1996) 0.32 0.47 
Year 1997 (proportion of observations from 1997) 0.40 0.49 
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Endnotes 
 
1.  A national survey of CSA farms found that over 94 percent produced organically 
(Lass, et al.). 
2.  Respondents were from the following states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
3.  Response rates were: 46 percent, 35 percent and 33 percent, in 1995, 1996 and 1997, 
respectively. 
4.  On many CSA farms, shareholders can obtain reductions in the price of a share by 
working on the farm. 
5.  CSA respondents were asked to estimate the weight of produce contained in a full 
share in a typical week by month. Because the weights per share were estimates, we felt 
that share prices were the most accurate variables available to use as weights in creating 
the number of full-share-equivalents.  
6.  Initially, we estimated the model in reduced-form, i.e., price as a function of all 
exogenous variables. Using this method, the presence, but not the extent, of market 
power can be determined. In perfect competition, price equals marginal cost. Thus 
imposing a set of zero restrictions on exogenous demand shifters constitutes a test of 
perfect competition. Using a chi-square test on those restrictions, we rejected the 
hypothesis of perfect competition at the one percent level of statistical significance, 
concluding that the finding of market power is robust. In fact, the market parameter 
estimates varied little with changes in model specification ranging from a low of around 2 
percent to just over 4 percent. While we are admitting to a limited specification search 
exercise, there are no other cross-sectional, firm-level analyses to guide us. 
